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Return to Virginia Business - September 2003

Cover story

Q&A with Richard Fairbank

Related story:
- Changing course

Editor's Note: Richard Fairbank, chairman and CEO of Capital One Financial Corp., talked with writer Jack Milligan in late July for our September cover story on changes at the financial services company. Here's an edited version of the transcript, which covers everything from the company's move away from the sub-prime to its funding and national branding strategy.


Milligan: I'd like you to speak to the shift in business focus, moving away from sub- prime, emphasizing prime and super prime more. What are the reasons for the change and what impact do you think it will have on your growth in earnings going forward?

Fairbank: A lot has been made about Capital One's shift up market and it's certainly a term I have used, but I want to put it in context because this shift has been going on for years. In fact, let me go way back to the beginning of Capital One. The first thing that defined our company is we came out with an up market product. We came out at 9.9% APR when the industry was at 19.8% APR, because our view was credit costs seem to be very high for consumers…Lenders were taking a one -size-fits-all approach, and we felt we could de-average the marketplace and identify customers who deserved prices at half of the prevailing rate. And that was the centerpiece of our strategy.

Over time our goal was to expand out to be a full credit spectrum lender, so we began to become increasingly successful with sub-prime lending (lending to higher-risk customers with poor credit histories). We had carefully structured products that both protected Capital One and also protected the consumer from getting in over his or her head. By the mid '90s, we started growing significantly in sub-prime while continuing our efforts up market.

Meanwhile, the prime marketplace became a very difficult place to make money with everybody jumping from one teaser rate to another and very large credit lines being offered. So we de-emphasized that segment of the business, but at the same time starting going after the high end of the prime market. In about 1997 we coined the word that's now became a standard in the financial services marketplace--the term super prime to describe the upper end, blue chip segment of the market --where we began to aggressively market. When sub-prime became so out of favor a year ago, it became clear to us that it would serve our interest well and the interest of our shareholders well if we adjusted the mix somewhat to do less sub-prime and even more up market. .. Several of our competitors had melted down. And so that's what we describe as our quote unquote "move up market." It's not new in the sense that we've been doing it for years. However, it does involve less growth of sub- prime and more rapid growth in prime and super prime.

Milligan: How will that affect your growth rate, because your growth rate in the past has just been stupendous? It would be hard to imagine that it would continue like that indefinitely.

Fairbank: Yeah, I think you hit the nail on the head. As we become a Fortune 200 company, just the sheer mass of our size makes it less realistic to have 30 and 40 percent earnings per share growth rate. But also it is the case that sub-prime is a very profitable business for us. As we slow down the growth of sub-prime, that will be a contributing factor to slower earnings growth for the company. Now that's slower in the context of the 30 and 40 percent earnings growth. Capital One is still on track to have significant earnings growth and to be one of the fastest growing large financial institutions in America.

Remaining a growth stock
Milligan: Do you still consider yourself to be a growth stock?

Fairbank: Oh absolutely, yes. It's a growth stock in the context of large companies.
Evaluating Capital One has been challenging sometimes because we've gone from basically start up to Fortune 200 company in a very short period of time. I think both for those who follow the company and also for those who run it, we have to keep re-grounding our own expectations. …It doesn't feel like we're growing any slower. What's happening is our overall growth rate is slowing down the velocity of growth laterally so to speak. In terms of diversification, growth is faster than it's ever been. Whereas we had basically just the credit card business five years ago, we now have significant growth and even profits coming from international installment loan, auto finance, and we've also grown a big deposit business over the last number of years. So I think very much Capital One is still a growth company.

Milligan: It's always been my opinion that the Achilles heel of the specialty finance company like a Cap One is really on the funding side. Certainly your stock has been volatile, and that reflects I'm sure perceptions people have based upon either what's going on in the economy or what was happening specifically at Cap One. But your stock can float up and down--that doesn't necessarily disrupt the way you do business. If you have problems on the funding side, you can end up being out of business, and no one would understands that better than you.

Fairbank: Yes.

Milligan: I'm curious. When the concern was being expressed 18 months ago about the company's degree of exposure to sub-prime, were you having any funding problems?

Fairbank: No, let me explain the context of the challenge of being what we call a mono line-- what you're calling a specialty finance company. When you start in financial services you've got to start somewhere ---- niche --- starts with a single line of business and goes from there. If you look at the list of companies that have been specialty finance companies in the '90s--by our tally there were 50 specialty finance companies. Today there are very few left. Many are dead. A lot have been sold. And of the remaining companies, many of them are hanging by their fingernails.

Drop in number of competitors
Milligan: There are only three right?

Fairbank: What are the three that you have in mind?

Milligan: Well, in addition to you, there's MBNA and there's Countrywide.

Fairbank: I'd like that to be your list, not mine because I don't want to get myself in trouble with my competitors and what category I'm putting them in. But certainly you've named what most people would put as the three most healthy ones. But when an industry that's gone from 50 to three so to speak--and there are others that are alive but they're sort of operating with difficulty--that's a profound statement of the challenges that specialty finance companies face. It gives you profound insight into why there's so much volatility in stock price and concern in the constituencies out there, be they regulators, debt markets or equity markets because they feel like, 'I've seen this story before and it doesn't have a happy ending.' And the pattern recognition is rather obvious.

Now long ago we started focusing on the demise of many of our competitors, our colleagues, and focused on what's causing this and what can we do about that. And it's hard, and so I'm going to give a broader answer to your question, Jack, but funding's going to be one of the pieces of this thing. Typically these companies have failed for one or more of three reasons.

Since specialty finance companies securitize their assets, they're required by the accounting to take these assets and take the entire gain of future earnings from these assets and record them today, even though the contingent liability still remains. I don't want to get into a complicated accounting argument, but what we have done is taken a very conservative approach to that. In auto finance we deviated from industry practice by putting these, our securitized loans, on the balance sheet, causing us not to take any gains but also in fact to have to build reserves the old fashioned ways. So without boring you with a lot of detail on that issue, certainly one of the problems was accounting practices, but I think over time it's now been cleaned up in the industry. We just didn't go there and that helped us avoid some of the problems that our competitors had.

The second problem has been credit problems. What we have done is implement maniacally conservative credit practices. For example, in all of our business decisions we hardwire in a methodology of assuming a recession starts tomorrow morning. All of the decisions have to be in the context of an absolute assumption of a recession instead of 'Gee it might happen and it might not.' That's forced us to be very conservative. Through all the years we have really stayed clear of credit problems that have plagued our competitors.

The third reason, and this is to your question, that specialty finance companies got problems is they've had rather flimsy funding and so when they run into any other problem--like an accounting problem or a credit problem--the wholesale funding dries up, and it's the beginning of the end. So what have we done? We have had a strategy to fortify our funds through incredibly conservative stockpile funding, having a big liquidity portfolio, a large capital base, and also building a deposit business.

Several years ago we went out and built a large deposit business; whereas the Household's of the world, Household International - that huge company that sold out earlier this year - they had never built a deposit base. That's another whole source of funding of FDIC insured deposits. We go back to where 27% of all of our funding now is deposits. So conservative accounting, conservative credit, conservative funding have been the cornerstone of making us able to ride through all the wild fluctuations in the marketplace still with the wheels intact. However the other part of our strategy, Jack, is to say that at the end we don't want to be a specialty finance company; we want to be a diversified financial services company. So we have put a lot of energy over time into diversifying our product line, but that takes some years to get there.

Milligan: If Cap One ever decided to sell out, I would think it would be not because you ran out of growth and decided it was time to cash in, but because your growth was being restrained by either your ability to fund it--which probably isn't true-or maybe because you just got tired of living with the uncertainty of every time the bond market got a case of the yips you sort of got whipsawed a little bit. There's a question in there, and I apologize for the soliloquy.

Fairbank: Well, it's obvious what the question is. What you're doing is focusing on the risks that have plagued specialty finance companies, and it's implicitly a great question. Every one of these areas we take a risk, we work backwards from what would be a really bad scenario and then try to protect against that. You know one can never protect against every conceivable risk. So therefore in funding we divide our funding between the easy to get funding, which is the senior funding. So the A and Triple A funding--that is at the top of the pecking order so to speak-- there's a whole bunch of. The bulk of our funding we do is Triple A-rated and borrowers get first claim. They're highest on the pecking order for the Triple A- funding. Do you follow me?

Milligan: Yes

Fairbank: What will typically happen to specialty finance companies is the lower-rated debt that's farther down the subordinated chain--that is more difficult to get. What we've done is just worked to stockpile that kind of funding. For example, with our Triple B- funding, which is the lowest level of asset -backed funding, we are already stockpiled into the latter part of 2004, and here we're in the middle of 2003.

Fairbank: There are no guarantees in this world, but what we try to do is to take extreme measures to protect ourselves, and collectively what we've done in terms of financial management, credit risk management and funding is very much different from what our competitors have done.

Selling Capital One?
Milligan: Are you confident right now in your funding that the sale of the company is not something that would be necessary to preserve it as an ongoing business operation?

Fairbank: Actually, I think we're probably in the strongest position we have ever been with respect to funding right now. Because we're more stockpiled and more diversified than we have been in the past. So I think we feel very good about our funding situation.

Milligan: Okay.

Fairbank: In a nutshell this past year, if you're an outside party, a debt investor, a regulator, an equity investor, even someone from the media looking at pattern recognition--it's pretty clear a number of credit card players got into trouble and particularly sub- prime credit card players. So the logical thing to do is to look at who else is out there with the risk factors? Those risk factors are credit card or a mono line sort of specialty finance company structure, some degree of sub-prime in the mix, fast growth and credit cards. So we had all of the risk factors…They saw all of those things present at Capital One, and high growth--I don't know if I mentioned that but that certainly was one of the factors that was an issue-- so understandably people got concerned about Capital One.

The good thing was that we had the underlying financial strength of Capital One and the underlying credit quality was such that we were able to ride through this period of uncertainty very much intact without in fact significantly deviating from the trajectory our company was on anyway. In the process the regulators, seeing the pattern, certainly wanted to make sure that Capital One had the right kind of reserves in capital to put, in fact even a higher level had been requested before to make sure that, to protect against the kind of problems that happened to other companies. We were very much able to deliver on that because we had a lot of earnings power and a lot of extra capital. We've been able to go through this very noisy period and come out the other side a stronger company for having gone through it.

Company's new structure
Milligan: Last thing. The departure of Nigel Morris. As I understand it, he will not be replaced as chief operating officer?

Fairbank: Right, we're going to go to a structure many companies are turning to these days which is the multi-divisional model with several strong division presidents. In the past we've sort of had just one division, the credit card division but now we have enough mass to really have several substantial divisions. We have an auto finance business that is really taking off, and we also have international business and some other lending businesses. While I'm very sad to see my colleague leave --and he's a good friend and a very talented guy-- we're trying to take this opportunity to restructure the governance of the company to a more classical governance model with a 10- person executive committee and the strong divisional presidents model as opposed to the chief operating office model.

Looking ahead-auto finance to play bigger role
Some investors who follow Capital One challenge whether this shift in corporate culture will work. Fairbank says he's used to naysayers.

Fairbank: What we have always had is a very bold strategic agenda to get to a destination that has very much been the same for many, many years-- which is to take our information-based strategy and build a diversified financial services company that is able to compete market by market using this methodology of mass customizing products.

It started in credit cards, and we had a lot of success in credit cards…We went in the auto finance business with a belief that people going into a car dealership and spending a couple of hours trying to get financing in a world where we're already sending pre approved financing to folks in credit cards, you know why not try to reinvent that industry by bringing simple pre -approved solutions to auto finance consumers in the same way we've been doing it in credit cards? That's probably the fastest growing part of Capital One. I don't know if you saw the earnings in the second quarter, but take a look at the auto finance number. It's just turned the corner, and it's going to contribute significantly to our profitability going forward.

We've gone into the installment loan business with a focus only on super prime and with the nation's lowest prices have built a fast- growing business there. The common theme is to go into markets in which competitors have used traditional marketing approaches and to try to bring simple no-hassle and better-priced solutions to the consumers.

Coming full circle?
Milligan: If I recall correctly Signet Bank (from which Capital One spun off in 1994), before it was acquired, tried to essentially reinvent itself as a good retail bank that was sort of like a national products company.

Fairbank:
Yes, you have a very good memory.

Milligan: I don't know that they had your skill set in terms of business information strategies, so that may have been something beyond their reach, but could you ever foresee Cap One returning to its roots in a sense of harnessing some kind of retail on the ground operation with this skill you have of selling financial products nationwide and globally?

Fairbank: I think it's in the long run part of our destiny. You know we have initially focused on direct marketing, so you'll find that everything we did for many years was direct to the consumer. But then we got into indirect auto lending where we were going through dealers, and that was a new step for Capital One. I think you know since most retail products in America are sold through traditional on the ground, face-to-face distribution networks, I think some involvement by Capital One in those distribution channels will be inevitable. By the way Signet, I think, never got a chance to really get its strategy fully developed before they in fact sold out to First Union. So we never did see the end of that chapter.

"What's in your wallet?"
Fairbank: The last thing I want to say-- although you didn't ask the question-- is something I think readers are interested in and that's what's going on with this brand strategy and the "What's in your wallet?" campaign? And let me comment because Jack, that's also part of the grand plan here.

The grand plan of going from a single specialty finance one-product company to a diversified financial institution. Part of what enabled us to build Capital One is that we were able to ride on the back of two of the world's most well known brands--Visa and Master Card. We got what we paid for though, which is we became one of America's largest companies that nobody had heard of. Many of our customers confused us with Visa and Master Card. Our view is if we want to build one of the nation's great financial institutions--particularly in products beyond credit cards--we're going to need at some point to develop a brand identity of our own.

Three years ago we made the decision to embark, with very substantial investment, to go a different way from most of our credit card competitors who were still riding in the Visa/Master Card sort of brand umbrella and go out and create a brand identity of our own. And so we have stuck with this investment for several years. We're very pleased with the results, but I think we're in a very different place now than we were a few years ago in that I think 96% of Americans are familiar with Capital One. When you ask Americans the name of a credit card company, Capital One is the most commonly named company.

Just being recognized isn't all that one's trying to achieve in brand, but this is part of a long process of trying to create a brand identity with a company that brings simple no- hassle and well- priced solutions to consumers who are frustrated and bewildered by the ever more complicated experience of trying to manage their financial lives. We believe that is a very big vein to tap into from a brand point of view. Everything that you will see out of Capital One will be consistently moving toward that brand identity, and we hope to stake out that space in a way meaningfully differentiated from our competitors.

Milligan: Charles Collie isn't going to want to hear that you think that you've got the strongest credit card brand in the country.

Fairbank: By the way, I think American Express has the strongest credit card brand. To be honest with you, we have great admiration for their brand. It begins with brand recognition, but in the end one wants to move to a place where great companies have gone like Nike and Volvo and many others who, not only have brand recognition, but also really stand for something in consumers' eyes that is highly differentiated from the competition. So we've got a long way to go, and I don't think MBNA or American Express should be shaking in their boots thinking about Capital One. But in our own little way, we continue quietly toward building what we hope someday will be one of America's great financial institutions.

Virginia Business - September 2003


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